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Lainsbury: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Evidence Law

EVIDENCE LAW
A.

FourthAmendment Exclusionary Rule Held Inapplicablein
Parole/ProbationaryHearings

On June 8, 1999, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
evidence improperly obtained by the state in violation of the
Minnesota Constitution need not be excluded from parole or
probation revocation hearings.' In State v. Martin,2 the court
adopted the approach of the United States Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,' which held that
the exclusion of wrongfully obtained evidence in parole hearings
was improper.4
In Martin, the defendant pled guilty to a third-degree
controlled substance crime for possession of drugs.5
The
defendant received a thirty-four month stayed sentence, and was
placed on probation for three years, on condition that he not
possess any nonprescription drug.6 Approximately one year later,
the defendant was stopped and arrested for careless driving.7 A
search incident to the arrest revealed crack cocaine in the
defendant's pocket, which resulted in a charge of fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance.8
At trial, Martin moved to suppress the crack cocaine, arguing
that his arrest was illegal under Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6.01. 9 Martin argued that the arrest was barred under
1. See State v. Martin, 595 N.W.2d 214, 215-16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review
denied, (Minn. Aug. 25, 1999).
2. 595 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 25,
1999).
3. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
4. See id. at 358; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that
state courts violate the U.S. Constitution when they allow the prosecution to admit
improperly obtained evidence in criminal trials).
5. See Martin, 595 N.W.2d at 215.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 215-16 (noting that Martin contended the illegality of the arrest,
arguing that police should have given him a citation for misdemeanor careless
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the rule, and that the evidence should be suppressed as a result. °
The district court agreed, withheld the crack cocaine evidence, and
dismissed the fifth-degree possession charge.1"
At Martin's later probation revocation hearing, the district
court held that the cocaine was admissible to prove that he had
violated the conditions of his probation.12 The court revoked
Martin's probation, and ordered him to serve his thirty-four
months in prison." Martin appealed the decision, arguing that the
illegally obtained evidence
should have been excluded from his
4
revocation hearing.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the
recent Scott decision, holding that the Fourth Amendment5
exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings.
As a preliminary matter, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
though Scott applied only to parole hearings, there was6 no material
difference between parole and probationary hearings.
Martin argued that Minnesota should construe its exclusionary
rule more expansively than the federal rule, in order to better
protect citizens from impermissible governmental conduct. 7
driving instead of arresting him). Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 6.01
subdivision 1 (1) (a) provides:
Law enforcement officers acting without a warrant. .. shall issue citations
to persons subject to lawful arrest for misdemeanors, unless it reasonably
appears to the officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent
bodily harm to the accused or another or further criminal conduct, or
that there is a substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond
to a citation.
R. CRIM. P. 6.01, subd. 1(1)(a).
10. See Martin, 595 N.W.2d at 215-16.
11. Seeid. at 216.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.; see also Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524
U.S. 357, 358 (1998) ("Application of the exclusionary rule [to parole violations]
would be incompatible with the traditionally flexible, nonadversarial,
administrative procedures of parole revocation ... in that it would require
extensive litigation to determine whether particular evidence must be
excluded ....).
16. See Martin, 595 N.W.2d at 216.
17. See id. at 217 ("[T]he separate state constitution will be of little value if a
reviewing court automatically follows a United States Supreme Court decision
interpreting a provision in the federal constitution that is identical with a
provision in the state constitution.").
MINN.
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Specifically, Martin urged the court to adopt a "right-vindicating"
rationale for the rule, as had the Oregon Supreme Court. Under
the "right vindicating" theory, illegally obtained evidence is
suppressed in order to vindicate the rights of an aggrieved party,
rather than solely to deter wrongful governmental conduct. 9
The court of appeals rejected Martin's arguments, stating that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the sole
purpose of Minnesota's exclusionary rule is the same as the federal
rule-to deter improper governmental conduct. The court held
that in order to apply the exclusionary rule in the present case, the
benefits of deterrence must outweigh any negative impact on the
probationary system."
The Minnesota Court of Appeals placed great weight on the
fact that the offending officer had no knowledge of Martin's
22
probationary status at the time of the violation. For this reason,
the court decided that the "marginal deterrent effect" of the
exclusionary rule under the circumstances was outweighed by the
potential costs to the probationary system, thus rejecting Martin's
23
appeal and affirming the lower court's revocation of probation.
B. Benefit of Evidence of Crimes By Other Gang Members Essential to
Convict Defendant of Crime Committed Forthe Benefit of a Gang
Outweighed Prejudiceto Defendant
In State v. Chuon,14 the Minnesota Court of Appeals had an
opportunity to consider the elements of Minnesota Statute section
25
609.229, commission of crimes for the benefit of a gang. Here,
18. See id.; see also State v. Davis, 834 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Or. 1992).
19. See Scott, 524 U.S. at 358 ("The exclusionary rule is ... ajudicially created
means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.").
20. See Martin, 595 N.W.2d at 218.
21. See id. at 219. The court of appeals reasoned that "[t]he purpose of
probation is rehabilitation without incarceration." Id. The court was also
concerned that the exclusionary rule might obstruct the probation system from
accomplishing its remedial purpose by "(1) preventing the court from considering
relevant evidence in deciding whether to revoke probation; (2) allowing
probationers to escape the consequences of noncompliance; and (3) making
courts reluctant to place defendants on probation," due to the fear that they will
be unable to consider relevant evidence in a future probation proceeding. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. 596 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 25,
1999).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 609.229 (1998) (stating that a violation of this statute is
a substantive criminal offense, not merely a sentence enhancement factor).
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the court of appeals reviewed the district court's decision to allow
testimony regarding arrest and conviction of the other members of
the defendant's gang and the potential unfair prejudice the
testimony may create.
Monivorn Kim, a member of the "Asian Boyz" street gang, was
shot in the shoulder after confronting a member of a rival gang,
the "Red Cambodian Bloods," in the parking lot of a St. Paul gas
station.26
Kim and three other eyewitnesses identified the
27
defendant, Phoeuy Chuon, as the man who had shot him.
Defendant Chuon was convicted of attempted first-degree
murder, attempted second-degree murder, drive-by shooting and
crime committed for the benefit of a gang. 28 For these offenses,
Chuon was sentenced to 186 months in prison.
To prove that Chuon had committed the crime for the benefit
of a gang, the state was required to demonstrate that the crime had
actually benefited a gang. A gang is defined as a group that
(1) has, as one of its primary activities, the commission of
one or more of the offenses listed in section 609.11,
subdivision 9; (2) has a common name or common

identifying sign or symbol; and (3) includes members who
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal activity.
To prove the first and third elements, the district court
allowed the state to present the testimony of a police officer having
extensive experience with Asian gangs. The officer estimated the
number of members of the Red Cambodian Bloods to be about

26.
shirted
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Chuon, 596 N.W.2d at 269 (noting that Kim identified Chuon as a redcar passenger who pointed and then fired a gun at him).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
31. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.229, subd. 1 (1998)); see also MINN. STAT. §
609.11, subd. 9 (including the following offenses: murder in the first, second, or
third degree; assault in the first, second or third degree; burglary; kidnapping;
false imprisonment; manslaughter in the first or second degree; aggravated
robbery; simple robbery; criminal sexual conduct; escape from custody; arson in
the first, second, or third degree; drive-by shooting; or any attempt to commit any
of these offenses).
32. See Chuon, 596 N.W.2d at 269 (reporting that the officer was assigned to
the Gang Strike Force and was familiar with Asian gangs).
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fifty, and offered the names of the members as evidence." The
officer gave his expert opinion that one of the primary objectives of
the Red Cambodian Bloods was the commission of violent crimes. 34
To support his opinion, the officer cited arrests and charges
filed against members of the gang for attempted murder,
aggravated robbery, and carrying a gun without a permit. 35 The
officer then gave his expert opinion that the shooting at issue was
committed to uphold the honor of the gang against the victim's
challenge at the gas station.' 6
On appeal, defendant Chuon argued that the trial court had
abused its discretion by allowing the officer's testimony regarding
crimes committed by other members of the gang.37 Chuon argued
that he had quit the gang several years earlier, and that the
evidence of crimes committed by others was improper and had led
381
to his conviction on all counts.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized that relevant
evidence might be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.3 9 The court also
recognized that the commission of a crime for the benefit of a gang
is a separate criminal offense. 4 0 Given the elements of the statute,
the evidence was not only probative, but was essential to the state's
case.4 1 Thus, the court held that, "[t]he prejudice to Chuon
therefore, even if 'unfair' prejudice, is far outweighed by the
probative value of the evidence." 42
C.

Tape Recording of Defendant's Statements to Companion in the Back
of a Squad CarDid Not Violate Fifth Amendment Right Against SelfIncrimination

On May 14, 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
the admissibility of surreptitiously tape-recorded statements made
by an arrested party while seated in the rear of a squad car. In State

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 270.
See id. at 269-70.
See id. at 270; MINN. R. EVID. 403.
See Chuon, 596 N.W.2d at 270.
See id.
Id.
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v. Edrozo,43 the court concluded that under the circumstances, the
statements were not compelled and thus did not violate the
defendant's right against self-incrimination."
On the evening of July 25, 1996, Stillwater police officers
responded to a call of two vehicles drag racing.45 Upon arrival,
officers were met by a group of young men, who reported that their46
vehicle had been rear-ended by a truck driven by the defendant.
The young men stated that the defendant was armed, had
threatened them, and had driven onto the sidewalk numerous
times in an attempt to run them over. 47 As the officer was speaking
with the men, the suspect vehicle drove past, approximately one
4
49
block away. 48 The officer pursued and stopped the vehicle.
The officer found several young men in the vehicle.50 Two of
the victims were transported to the scene and positively identified
51
the defendant as the driver who had tried to run them over.
The defendant, Edrozo, was placed in the rear of a squad car
along with one of his companions.52 The officer left them alone in
the rear of the squad.53 Unbeknownst to either Edrozo or his
had left a tape recorder running to capture
companion, the officer
S 54
their conversation. The conversation included threats against the
alleged victims, and a statement that the police would not find any
evidence of their truck being involved in the collision.55 At the
placed
time, neither Edrozo nor his companion had been formally
56
under arrest nor been advised of their Mirandarights.

At the omnibus hearing, the trial court suppressed the
recorded statement on the grounds that it was unfairly obtained,
and violated Edrozo's Fifth Amendment58 right to not incriminate
7
himself.5 The court of appeals affirmed.

43.
1997).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

578 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. 1998), rev , 567 N.W.2d 59 (Minn. Ct. App.
See id. at 726.
See id. at 721.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 722.
See id.
See id.
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In reversing the lower courts, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reiterated its understanding of the rule from Miranda v. Arizona,59
stating "[s]tatements made by a suspect during custodial
interrogation
are generally
inadmissible unless the suspect is first
•
.
•
,,60
Thus, the inquiry must consider two
given a Miranda warning.
factors: (1) whether or not the suspect was in custody; and (2)
whether the person in custody is subjected to express questioning,
or its "functional equivalent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court took issue with the appellate
court's finding that the police conduct in question amounted to
62
the "functional equivalent" of interrogation.
The "functional
equivalent" of interrogation arises when the person in custody
subjectively believes that he is being compelled to offer a
statement. In reversing the appellate court, the supreme court
held that the correct analysis should revolve around the perspective
of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. 64
The Minnesota Supreme Court thus held that Edrozo's
statements were not compelled, and that nothing should prevent
65
his words from being used against him.
Therefore, the
suppression order of the district court was clearly erroneous, and
the case was remanded. 66
D. "PastPatternof Domestic Abuse" is Not "Other Crimes" Evidence in
Prosecutionfor First-DegreeDomestic Abuse Homicide
On April 23, 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided two
important issues that arose in connection with Minnesota Statute
section 609.185(6),67 Minnesota's first-degree domestic abuse
homicide statute. In State v. Cross,t 8 the supreme court held that
evidence of other criminal acts that establish a past pattern of
domestic abuse is an element of the crime, and thus will not be
58.
N.W.2d
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See State v. Edrozo, 567 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Minn. Ct. App.1997), rev'd, 578
719 (Minn. 1998).
See 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
See Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d at 719.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 725.
See id.
See id. at 726.
See id.
MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (1998).
577 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 1998).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

7

William
Mitchell LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. 26,LAW
Iss. 4 [2000],
Art. 15
WILLIAM
REVIEW

1306

[Vol. 26:4

considered "other crimes" evidence under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(b). 69 In addition, it was held that the statute only
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a past pattern of
domestic abuse, not proof as to each individual underlying act, as
70
the defendant had argued.
On June 28, 1996, two witnesses observed defendant Cross and
the victim sitting in a car parked at the side of the road.71 They saw
Cross "vigorously" slapping the victim, who was sitting behind the
72
wheel. The witnesses, who were driving past, circled the block to
find Cross standing outside the car, leaning through the driver's
window while his arms and upper body moved back and forth in a
'jerking" motion.73
The witnesses called police, and upon their arrival, the police
found the victim outside the car, with bystanders administering
CPR.
The victim was taken to the hospital where she was
pronounced dead. 75 The medical examiner determined that the
76
cause of death was manual strangulation. 76
Cross was charged with first-degree domestic abuse homicide.7 7
The domestic abuse homicide statute refers to conduct that "causes
the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse,
when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic
abuse upon the victim and the death occurs under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." 78 At trial, the
state offered, and the court admitted numerous pieces of evidence
to show that Cross had enqaged in such a past pattern of domestic
abuse against the victim.
Cross was ultimately convicted of
domestic abuse homicide, as well as second-degree intentional
homicide. 0
69.

See id. at 725; MINN. R. EVD.404(b).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Cross, 577 N.W.2d at 726-27.
id. at 723.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
78. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (1998).
79. See Cross, 577 N.W.2d at 724. The prosecution offered the testimony of
persons who had either witnessed Cross abusing the victim, or had seen evidence
of such abuse. See id. In addition, the state was allowed to offer testimony by the
medical examiner that described older injuries that appeared to be consistent with
abuse inflicted by another, as opposed to accidental injury. See id.
80. See id.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/15
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On appeal, Cross argued that Minnesota Rule of Evidence
404(b) should have governed the evidence regarding his past
conduct." Under the rule, "[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or
act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith." 82 Thus, the evidence should
83
have been subject to the safeguards established by State v. Billstrom,
and proven by clear and convincing evidence.8 In addition, Cross
argued that the domestic abuse homicide statute itself required
that each incident offered to show the past pattern
of domestic
8 5
abuse must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected both of Cross's
86
arguments. The court recognized that the evidence of the prior
abusive conduct was not offered to show "other crimes" within the
meaning of Rule 404(b), but was direct evidence,
necessary to
•87
prove an element of the crime with which Cross was charged. As
such, the state must be allowed to offer relevant evidence of a past
pattern of domestic abuse, so long as its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 8
In response to Cross's second argument, the court held that
the plain language of the statute indicated that only the past
pattern of domestic abuse need be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.89 Therefore, each underlying act comprising the pattern of
abuse need not be individually proven beyond a reasonable doubt
as Cross had asserted. 90
E. A Clarificationof "StalePriorConvictions" UnderMinnesota Rule of
Evidence 609
In State v. Ihnot,91 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered for
the first time the appropriate end point for the ten-year period that
defines a stale claim under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609(b) .92
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 724; MINN. R. EVID. 404(b).
MINN. R. EVID. 404(b).
276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967).
See id. at 177, 149 N.W.2d at 284-85.
See Cross, 577 N.W.2d at 726.
See id. at 726-27.
See id. at 725-26,
See id.
See id. at 726-27.
Seeid. at 727.
575 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. 1998).
See id. at 583; see also MINN. R. EVID. 609(b).
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Rule 609(b) deals with the admission of evidence regarding past
convictions offered to attack the credibility of a witness at trial.
Rule 609 mandates that evidence of a conviction is not
admissible if more than ten years has elapsed since the date of
conviction or the release of the witness from confinement imposed
for the conviction, whichever is longer. 94 The rule does not,
however, denote the end point for that time period in relation to a
present action. 95 Should the ten-year period have elapsed, the
evidence of the prior conviction will not be admitted absent a
finding by the court that, in the interests of justice, the probative
value of the conviction substantiallyoutweighs its prejudicial effect.9r
In Ihnot's district court trial, the state filed a motion seeking to
introduce evidence of his prior felony convictions, should he
decide to testify on his own behalf.97 The district court ruled that
the evidence was admissible because the current crime was
committed within ten years of Ihnot's release from probation from
the previous crime. 98 Ihnot did not testify, and the jury did not99
hear the impeachment evidence regarding the prior conviction.
Ihnot was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct. 00
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
trial court erred in ruling that release from probation was the
appropriate date from which to begin counting the ten-year
period.'(
Thus, the prior conviction was stale, and the district
court had neglected to make the required finding that the
probative value of the evidence "substantially" outweighed its
prejudicial effect.' °2 The court of appeals further held that "Ihnot
was deprived of his right to testify in his own defense due to the
1
threatened use of improperly admitted impeachment evidence. 03
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court carefully considered
differing federal and state standards used to define the end of the
ten-year period for evidence of a past conviction to be considered
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See MINN. R. EVID. 609(b).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

103.

Id. at 583-84.
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stale. °4 The court identified three possible approaches: (1) the
date the trial begins; (2) the date the witness testifies; or (3) the
date of the charged offense. The court rejected the first two
options as infirm, due to the potential for unfair manipulation by
opposing counsel. 10 '
In choosing the third approach and reversing the court of
appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the potential
difficulty in pinpointing the exact date of the charged offense, but
held that it was the most workable and most closely embodied the
values behind the rule. 0 6 Therefore, the evidence of Ihnot's prior
conviction was not stale, as ten years had not elapsed between his
release from probation and the commission of the present
offense.' 07
Daniel Lainsbury

104. See id. at 584-85.
105. See id. at 585.
106. See id. The court noted that the purpose behind the rule was to limit the
probative value of prior convictions if the witness had exhibited "good behavior"
during the preceding ten years. See id. Thus, the period to be measured should
be just that-the period of unquestioned good behavior. See id. (discussing U.S. v.
Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 277 (5th Cir. 1979)).
107. See id.
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